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ern the procedure in criminal trials in those courts, and that by the laws in force in Virginia at that time co-defendants were not competent witnesses. Practically the same doctrine was applied in *Logan v. United States*, 144 U. S. 263, in which case the court held that the laws of Texas in force when that state was admitted to the Union must determine the admissibility of evidence in criminal proceedings by the United States government within that jurisdiction. While some doubt was cast upon the authority of these cases by the decision in *Benson v. United States*, 146 U. S. 325, the precise point was not involved. In the instant case, however, the same situation was presented to the court as appeared in the *Reid Case*. Guided by the modern conviction that the truth is more likely to be arrived at by hearing the testimony of all persons of suitable understanding, leaving the credibility and weight of such testimony to the court or jury, than by excluding the witnesses as incompetent, Mr. Justice CLARKE felt justified in repudiating the doctrine of the *Reid Case*, and concluded "that the dead hand of the common law rule of 1789 should no longer be applied to such cases as we have here."

HABEAS CORPUS—CUSTODY OF CHILD—VISITING.—By deed executed in accordance with the statute, a father transferred his parental authority and custody over his three-year-old daughter to her grand-aunt, who formally adopted her. Upon the death of the child's mother, her grandmother brought suit for the custody of this child and also for that of her sister and two brothers, making the father and grand-aunt defendants. The court decreed that the three-year-old child should be left in the care and custody of her adoptive parents but required them to allow the child to visit one day in each month in the home of her grandmother, to whom the control of the other children was awarded. The defendant appealed on the ground that the court had no authority to require these visits. *Held*, the court had such authority. *Kirby et ux. v. Morris* (Tex., 1917), 198 S. W. 995.

Appellants did not question the power of the court to award the custody *in toto* of the child as its best interests dictated, but objected to the limitation imposed upon their authority requiring visits to the child's grandmother. Similar limitations seem to be of rather common occurrence in divorce decrees, and, in fact, the court will rarely fail to order that the parents shall have access to their children at all reasonable times and places. *CHURCH, HABEAS CORPUS*, 449; *Wand v. Wand*, 14 Cal. 513; *Knoll v. Knoll*, 114 La. 703; *People v. Winston*, 65 App. Div. 231. Whether such provisions are made primarily with reference to the child's welfare, or in recognition of parental rights, may be an open question. The court in the instant case, basing their authority to issue this decree on the recognized power of courts to issue similar decrees in divorce proceedings, seem to assume that visiting is ordered in the interests of the children. A contrary conclusion is indicated by the case of *In re Succession of Reiss*, 46 La. Ann. 347, in which it was held that the court had no power to require a father to send his children to visit their grandmother, although it would seem to have been for their best interests.